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Empirical Article
According to guidelines for evidence-based practice (EBP; 
e.g., APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Prac-
tice, 2006), clinicians are expected to consider scientific 
evidence in their professional practice. Scientific evidence 
includes insights into the complex processes by which 
psychological, biological, and environmental factors inter-
act to cause and maintain psychological and psychiatric 
problems (Carr, 2006; De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006; 
Kendall, Holmbeck, & Verduin, 2004; Kendler, 2005; 
Kiesler, 1999; Morton, 2004). Theoretical models of spe-
cific disorders and theories of psychopathology summa-
rize and integrate these insights. For most psychological 
disorders several theoretical models have been proposed, 
which are not necessarily overlapping. For example, there 
are several empirically supported theories on ADHD (cf. 
Barkley, 2006), some of which focus on the underlying 
neurobiological processes, whereas others focus on how 
learning and experience maintain and aggravate patient’s 
problems. EBP also prescribes clinicians to use research 
evidence about effectiveness and efficacy of interventions 
(e.g., APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Prac-
tice, 2006). Clinicians are supposed to know the respective 
evidence and choose the treatment that presumable works 
the best for their patient. Finally, EBP asks clinicians to 
take into account their professional experience. Clinicians 
should monitor and assess their performance and use these 
insights when planning a treatment. Thus, clinicians are 
expected to consider empirically supported scientific theo-
ries about disorders, empirically proven effective interven-
tions, and their personal experience when judging the 
effectiveness of interventions and deciding on a treatment. 
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Evidence-based psychotherapy requires clinicians to consider theories of psychopathology and evidence about 
effectiveness, and their experience when choosing interventions. Research on clinical decision making indicates that 
clinicians’ theories of disorders might be personal and inform judgments and choices beyond current scientific theory 
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from therapists’ personal theories, which indicates that clinicians use personal theories in decision making. We discuss 
the implications of these findings for evidence-based practice.
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Moreover, EBP suggests to use the current best evidence 
in a “conscientious, explicit, and judicious” way (Sackett 
et al., 1996).
From the perspective of cognitive psychology, EBP is 
very challenging. It requires clinicians to integrate declar-
ative knowledge acquired from textbooks, guidelines, and 
research papers with instrumental knowledge acquired 
through experiential learning. It also asks clinicians to 
engage in deliberate decision making, carefully thinking 
about the positive and negative consequences that may 
result from the treatment while considering recommenda-
tions from guidelines and the wishes of the patient. Cog-
nitive psychology provides theoretical models explaining 
how clinicians may solve the tasks posed by EBP.
The first task is to integrate the different types of 
knowledge. Several theoretical accounts propose that cli-
nicians develop personal theories of specific disorders on 
the basis of their experience and knowledge (e.g., Custers, 
Boshuizen, & Schmidt, 1998; Garb, 2005). For example, 
Charlin, Boshuizen, Custers, and Feltovich (2007) assume 
that clinicians develop so-called illness scripts, which 
include signs and symptoms of a disease or disorder, its 
typical presentation, and the underlying causal mecha-
nism that leads to and maintains the problems of patients 
suffering from this disease. According to these psycho-
logical theories, clinicians’ theories are dependent on 
their individual knowledge and experience. Personal the-
ories are then used to make diagnoses, to explain a cli-
ent’s problems, and to decide on a treatment.
There is quite a bit of evidence that clinicians have per-
sonal theories that influence their judgments and decisions. 
Ahn, Proctor, and Flanagan (2009) asked mental health cli-
nicians about their beliefs about the causes of psychiatric 
disorders as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders (DSM–IV–TR; American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2000). The researchers inquired to which 
extent the disorders were caused by biological, psychologi-
cal, or environmental causes. Their first finding was that 
clinicians had assumptions about the causes of the various 
disorder, although the DSM defines the disorder without 
any reference to cause. They also found that if clinicians 
believed that a disorder had mainly a biological basis, they 
believed in no or few psychological or environmental 
causes, and vice versa. Furthermore, clinicians’ causal beliefs 
were related to their treatment preferences. Clinicians pre-
ferred medical treatments more often if they believed that a 
disorder had a biological origin, and they preferred psycho-
therapeutic treatments more often if they believed that it 
had a psychological or environmental cause (Ahn et  al., 
2009).
Further studies indicate that clinicians not only have 
beliefs about the causes leading to a disorder, but also 
have beliefs about the causal relations among the symp-
toms of mental disorders (Kim & Ahn, 2002). This is 
especially noteworthy, as the DSM makes no respective 
assumptions. Kim and Ahn (2002) showed that clinicians 
assume some symptoms to causally affect many other 
symptoms (i.e., causally central symptoms), some symp-
toms to be mere effects of other symptoms (i.e., noncentral 
symptoms), and some symptoms to be causally discon-
nected from others. It turned out that clinicians’ beliefs 
about the causal centrality of symptoms (i.e., their causal 
impact on other symptoms) affected clinicians’ diagnostic 
classifications, memories of case information, and infer-
ences (Kim & Ahn, 2002; Proctor & Ahn, 2007). Clinicians 
weighted causally central symptoms more in classification, 
remembered them better, and based inferences about other 
features on them.
The second task posed by EBP to clinicians is to make a 
deliberate, well-thought-out decision on the best course of 
treatment. In cognitive psychology, a number of theories 
have been proposed that explain how personal theories 
provide a basis for deciding on a course of action (e.g., 
Hastie & Pennington, 2000; Pliske & Klein, 2003; Sloman & 
Hagmayer, 2006). Causal model theories of decision mak-
ing (Hagmayer, Meder, Osman, Mangold, & Lagnado, 2010; 
Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006) assume that clinicians acquire 
a causal model of a disorder (i.e., a personal theory) 
through experiential, deliberate, and social learning. This 
causal model encompasses the factors that cause and main-
tain symptoms, as well as the causal mechanisms connect-
ing the factors and symptoms. Interventions (i.e., treatments 
in mental health) may target causes, maintaining factors, or 
symptoms, and can be part of the model. For example in 
cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), cognitive restructuring 
is assumed to target dysfunctional beliefs and attributions, 
whereas techniques of emotion regulation may directly tar-
get emotional instability as a symptom.
A generic causal model of a disorder can be used in 
several ways in judgment and decision making (for more 
details on how causal models may support clinical decision 
making, see Hagmayer & Fernbach, in press; Hagmayer & 
Witteman, in press). First, it allows a clinician to identify 
causally central factors, which are important to assess in an 
explanatory diagnosis and important to consider in treat-
ment planning. Second, a causal model allows a decision 
maker to infer which treatment will be more effective. Inter-
ventions that target causally central factors, affecting many 
other factors and symptoms, are likely to be more effective 
to improve the condition of the patient than treatments tar-
geting only a single symptom. Third, a causal model enables 
the decision maker to predict the consequences that should 
result from different interventions. These predictions can 
then be used to evaluate the progress of a treatment. If pre-
dicted changes happen, the client is probably on track.
The aim of the present study was to investigate clinicians’ 
personal theories of disorders and whether these theories 
are related to their expectations about the effectiveness of 
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interventions. Our main question was to what extent we 
could predict clinicians’ judgments about the effectiveness 
of interventions for a disorder from their personal theories 
for the disorders (i.e., their causal model). We also investi-
gated whether different clinicians have similar theories for a 
disorder, and whether clinicians agree about the effective-
ness of possible interventions for each disorder. If clinicians 
base their personal theories on scientific theories, supported 
by evidence from systematic research, one may expect to 
find a rather high agreement. However, as pointed out 
before, often several theories can be found in the literature. 
This situation may lead to a rather low agreement. The 
same might be true for the agreement about the effective-
ness of interventions. Systematic research provided us with 
good evidence about which therapies and treatment pro-
grams are effective and which are not (or substantially less 
effective). Rather little, however, is known, about the dif-
ferential effectiveness of individual intervention techniques 
or the causal mechanisms by which they work (De Los 
Reyes & Kazdin, 2006; Kazdin, 2008).
The research presented here goes beyond prior 
research. Previous studies investigated certain parts of cli-
nicians’ personal theories. Kim and Ahn (2002) explored 
only clinicians’ assumptions about the causal relations 
among DSM–IV symptoms (APA, 1994). As the DSM–IV 
hardly contains references to deeper causes, clinicians’ 
personal theories consisted mostly of factors on the 
behavioral or cognitive level, but neglected biological or 
environmental factors. Ahn et al. (2009) asked clinicians 
only to indicate the degree to which disorders are due to 
biological, social, or environmental factors. They did not 
inquire about the causal relations connecting causes, 
symptoms, and other relevant variables within each disor-
der. Hence, it is still an open question of which factors 
and causal relations are included in clinicians’ personal 
theories when they are requested to come up with a com-
prehensive account.
Previous studies also indicated that clinicians’ causal 
assumptions are related to treatment preferences (e.g., 
Ahn et al., 2009; Flores, Cobos, López, Godoy, & Ganzález-
Martín, 2014), but no study investigated how personal 
theories of disorders are linked to inferences about the 
relative effectiveness of treatments. De Kwaadsteniet, 
Hagmayer, Krol, and Witteman (2010) studied clinicians’ 
causal models of individual clients (i.e., their clinical case 
conceptions) and found that these models predicted cli-
nicians’ judgments of the relative effectiveness of differ-
ent interventions for the specific client. But they did not 
explore clinicians’ personal theories of the disorder.
Outline of Experiment and Hypotheses
We asked experienced child therapists to draw their per-
sonal causal theories of four prevalent developmental dis-
orders—attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 
autism, conduct disorder, and reactive attachment disor-
der—and to rate the effectiveness of 10 common and 
recommended types of interventions. For each of these 
four disorders several theories have been proposed in the 
literature, which are supported by empirical evidence (for 
respective overviews, see Carr, 2009; Mash & Barkley, 
2014). In addition, meta-analytic reviews and national 
guidelines make suggestions for evidence-based treat-
ments (e.g., National Institute for Health and Care Excel-
lence, 2008, 2011, 2013, 2015). In the Netherlands, the 
country in which the present study was conducted, there 
are guidelines for each of the four disorders, for example 
the Dutch Multidisciplinary Guideline ADHD (Trimbos-
instituut, 2007, 2011) and guidelines for effective interven-
tions from the Dutch Institute for Youth (NJi, 2013). 
Clinicians engaging in EBP should be aware of these sci-
entific theories and the guidelines (APA Presidential Task 
Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006).
We expected that clinicians would have rather elabo-
rate causal theories with biological, psychological, and 
environmental factors explaining the presence of the 
problems and symptoms characterizing each disorder. 
This expectation is based on the theory view of categori-
zation (Murphy & Medin, 1985), which assumes that cat-
egories like disorders have a theory-like structure, and on 
the fact that current scientific theories of the four disor-
ders are often complex, especially when an integrative 
account is proposed. For example, the dual-pathway 
model of ADHD (Sonuga-Barke, 2004) contains 19 differ-
ent variables despite omitting genetic factors, which have 
been proven to be causally relevant as well.
We expected to find rather low agreement among cli-
nicians with respect to their causal theories for a disorder. 
Developmental disorders are explained in divergent ways 
by different scientific theories (see, e.g., Morton, 2004). 
There are no universally agreed theories capturing all rel-
evant aspects of the four disorders investigated in our 
study (cf. Carr, 2009). So, even if clinicians would base 
their personal theories on scientific theories published in 
the literature and ignore their professional experience, 
we would not expect a high degree of consensus. Our 
expectation is also supported by previous studies inves-
tigating clinicians’ causal beliefs about disorders. Ahn 
and colleagues (2009) found only moderate agreement 
among clinicians about the degree to which biological, 
psychological, and environmental factors contribute to 
the disorders defined in the DSM–IV (interrater correla-
tions were .48, .53, and .32, respectively). Kim and Ahn’s 
(2002) studies indicate that the agreement about causal 
mechanisms connecting the symptoms characterizing a 
disorder is probably even lower (Kendall’s Ws for inter-
rater agreement for 10 familiar disorders were between 
.09 and .46). In addition, several studies have shown that 
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clinicians’ causal inferences about individual clients have 
poor concordance. For example, De Kwaadsteniet et al. 
(2010) found kappas of .20 and .29 for causal factors, and 
kappas of .26 and .29 for causal relations between fac-
tors. Kuyken, Fothergill, Musa, and Chadwick (2005) 
found percentages of agreement of 7% to 73%, with less 
agreement for more theory driven inferences. Persons 
and Bertagnolli (1999) found intraclass correlation coef-
ficients for agreement about inferences of the schemas 
underlying overt problems between .13 and .66.
We also expected no high agreement among clinicians’ 
ratings of the effectiveness of interventions. Conclusive 
evidence for the effectiveness of many interventions is 
still lacking, and existing evidence is often not conclusive 
for all client populations and contexts (APA Presidential 
Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006; Carr, 2009; 
Ollendick & King, 2000). For example, a recent Cochrane 
Review (Otasowie, Castells, Ehimare, & Smith, 2014) 
found the evidence for the usage of tricyclic antidepres-
sant medication for children and adolescents with ADHD 
to be of low quality. Moreover, there is often very little 
evidence about which of two evidence-based interven-
tions is more effective. The cited Cochrane review on 
antidepressant medication, for example, identified only 
one trial in which an antidepressant was compared to 
standard methylphenidate treatment. There is also still 
much unknown about the causal mechanisms that lead to 
and maintain disorders, and about the mechanisms by 
which interventions cause change (Bieling & Kuyken, 
2003; Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 
2006; Kazdin, 2008). Available guidelines on the assess-
ment and treatment of developmental disorders in the 
Netherlands (NJi, 2013; Trimbos-instituut, 2007) should 
raise agreement among clinicians, but doubts about the 
evidence base may lower the agreement. Therefore, we 
expected no high agreement.
Finally, we did expect that clinicians’ individual effec-
tiveness judgments for interventions would match their 
personal causal theories of the disorders, despite our 
expectation of low consensus among clinicians about 
theories for disorders and about effective interventions. 
Based on the causal model theory of decision making 
(Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006) and the existing evidence, 
we thus expected that effectiveness judgments could be 
predicted from clinicians’ personal theories. Note that 
such a predictive relation is possible even when thera-
pists do not agree about the theories of the disorders and 
the effectiveness of different interventions.
Method
Participants
Out of 24 child therapists working at three intramural 
institutions, 20 agreed to participate. The therapists 
treated boys and girls, aged 12 to 18 years, who had seri-
ous behavioral problems. Four therapists declined, 
because of the large time investment. Participants’ aver-
age experience was 5.0 years, ranging from 2 to 11 years 
(SD = 3.2). The median numbers of clients that partici-
pants had seen with each of the four disorders in the 
previous year were 8 for ADHD, 8 for autism, 10 for con-
duct disorder, and 15 for reactive attachment disorder 
(RAD). Seventeen clinicians were female. All participants 
had a clinical master’s degree in child psychology or spe-
cial education; five participants also had a post-master’s 
degree, which implies that they have had an additional 2 
years of training with courses and supervision. In the 
Netherlands, youth care professionals are often female 
(about 75%), and 43% are younger than 35 (Hollander, 
Van Klaveren, Faun, & Spijkerman, 2013). Our sample is 
relatively young, with a mean age of 28.4 (SD = 3.6). The 
level of education is highly representative of the level of 
education of Dutch youth care therapists, although increas-
ingly often post-master’s degrees are being required and 
obtained (NIP, 2016; NJi, 2015).
Participants received no compensation for their time 
investment (2 to 3 hours per participant). When the study 
was finished, results were presented and discussed with 
clinicians during an intervision conference.
Materials and procedure
We investigated child therapists’ causal theories about 
ADHD, autism, conduct disorder (CD), and RAD. These 
four disorders were the most prevalent disorders in the 
institutions our participants worked at. All participants 
engaged in a theory drawing task and an intervention rat-
ing task, with a time lag of 2 weeks in between. The time 
lag was necessary to prepare individualized materials for 
each participant (see Interventions rating task for details).
Theory drawing task. The experimenter made an 
appointment with each participant to make the drawing 
for the first disorder at participants’ offices. The order of 
disorders was counterbalanced across participants. Mate-
rials for the four disorders were the same, except for the 
names of the respective disorders written on top of all 
pages.
We asked participants to depict their personal theories 
in the causal modeling framework of Morton (2004). This 
framework can be used as a tool to analyze and compare 
personal as well as scientific theories, to scrutinize their 
causal claims, and to see whether they provide a coherent 
explanation (e.g., Fava & Morton, 2009; Krol, Morton, & De 
Bruyn, 2004). In the causal modeling framework, symp-
toms and causal factors are assigned to a biological, cogni-
tive, and behavioral level. Environmental factors are 
represented next to these three levels (see Fig. 1). Genetic 
factors, conditions of the brain, and other physical factors 
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are assigned to the biological level. Factors on the cognitive 
level include, for example, executive functions, information 
processing, and emotion regulation. On the behavioral 
level all observable behaviors are placed. Environmental 
factors are, among others, family factors, school factors, or 
societal/cultural factors. Causal relations between elements 
within the same level and between elements on different 
levels are represented with arrows. The framework imposes 
one restriction on the possible relations: A direct relation 
between a factor on the biological and a factor on the 
behavioral level is impossible; it should always be medi-
ated by one or more factors on the cognitive level.
Participants received stepwise instructions to draw 
their personal theory for the first disorder. All instructions 
were typed, although participants could always ask for 
clarification. First, participants received a list of symp-
toms that were extracted from the descriptions of the 
four disorders in the DSM–IV-TR (APA, 2000). For all four 
disorders, participants received the same list (symptoms in 









Odd reactions to stimuli














Fig. 1. Exemplary causal model for autism. The model is representative with respect to the number of variables and its 
overall complexity. Variables that were presented on the symptom list are in italics. The participant had drawn bidirec-
tional relations between the two environmental variables and all behavioral variables. We indicate these with asterisks 
to enhance the clarity of the figure.
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Table 1. Variables Included in Participants’ Theories






Environmental Parent-child interactions 0.15 0.15 0.40 0.20
 Pathogenic care 0.15 0.25 0.30 0.70
 Family problems 0 0.05 0.35 0.15
 Traumatic experience 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.10
 Peers’ influence 0.10 0 0.25 0
 School problems 0.05 0.05 0.10 0
 Lack of structure 0.40 0.25 0.10 0.05
 Social reactions 0.15 0.20 0 0.15
 Social isolation 0 0.15 0.10 0
Biological Birth complications 0 0.05 0 0.05
 Genetic disposition 0.30 0.40 0.25 0
 Neurological structure 0.15 0.55 0.15 0.15
 Neurotransmitter dysregulation 0.30 0 0.10 0.05
 Hypo-arousal 0 0 0.15 0.05
 Food/medication 0.05 0.05 0.05 0
 Temperament 0 0 0.20 0.05
Cognitive Intelligence/cognitive skills 0.35 0.50 0.20 0.15
 Executive functions 0.10 0.25 0.05 0
 Language delay 0 0.10 0 0
 Information processing 0.40 0.65 0.10 0.25
 Social information processing 0 0.20 0 0.05
 Rigidity 0.05 0.25 0.15 0
 Emotional/affect regulation problems 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.40
 Coping mechanisms 0 0 0.10 0.10
 Impulsivity 0.52 0 0.20 0
 Hyperactivity 0.55 0 0.05 0
 Inattention 0.75 0.05 0.05 0
 Lack of guilt, remorse 0.05 0.40 0.95 0.65
 Negative interpretations 0.10 0.20 0.75 0.60
 Low frustration tolerance 0.60 0.30 0.85 0.50
 Self-image 0.45 0.20 0.25 0.75
 Lack of empathy 0 0.90 0.60 0.65
Behavioral Aggression 0.14 0.20 1.0 0.50
 Poor school performance 0.70 0.15 0.50 0.20
 Restricted, repetitive, stereotypic behavior 0 1.0 0 0.05
 Destruction of property 0.30 0 0.85 0.20
 Temper outbursts 0.20 0.40 0.50 0.25
 Violations of rules 0.30 0 0.90 0.25
 Stubbornness 0.30 0.35 0.45 0.35
 Blames others 0.20 0.05 0.85 0.50
 Hyperactive behavior 0.55 0 0.05 0
 Impulsive behavior 0.75 0 0.30 0.10
 Deceitfulness/theft 0 0 0.85 0.20
 Problems in communication 0.20 1.0 0.15 0.15
 Risk seeking behavior 0.75 0 0.80 0.45
 Ambivalent relations 0 0 0 0.20
 Distrust 0 0 0 0.20
 Inattention 0.40 0 0 0
 Odd reactions to stimuli 0 0.35 0.05 0
 Attachment 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.90
 Conflicts with family/authorities 0.52 0.25 0.90 0.75
 Problems in social interactions 0.65 1.0 0.50 0.75
Note: ADHD = attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Values are proportions of the 20 participants. Variables that were 
presented on the symptom list are italicized.
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for each participant. We asked participants to indicate 
which symptoms they believed to be typical for the first 
disorder, that is, symptoms that often occurred with the 
disorder. Participants could add symptoms that they 
believed were typical but were not on the list. Second, 
participants received an empty causal modeling frame-
work on an A4-sized sheet of paper, indicating the bio-
logical, cognitive, environmental, and behavioral levels 
(see Fig. 1). They were asked to place the typical symp-
toms for the disorder in the framework, on the respective 
levels.
Third, we asked participants to think about the biologi-
cal, cognitive, and environmental factors they believed to 
cause and maintain the disorder, and to insert these at the 
appropriate levels in the framework. Fourth, participants 
were asked to indicate with arrows the causal relations 
they believed existed between the factors, between fac-
tors and symptoms, and between symptoms. We explained 
(a) that factors at one level can have relations with factors 
or symptoms at other levels, and with factors within the 
same level, (b) that factors may affect other factors directly, 
or indirectly, that is, via other factors, and (c) that mutual 
effects can be depicted with double arrows. Visualizations 
of these relations were shown in a separate figure, with-
out naming any factors or symptoms.
Finally, participants received a questionnaire asking 
them to rate how representative their drawing was for 
their thinking about the disorder. Completing all tasks for 
the first disorder took about half an hour. Figure 1 shows 
a participant’s causal model for autism.
Participants were thanked and received a package of 
materials to make the drawings for the remaining three 
disorders at their own convenience. The package con-
sisted of the instructions (the same as for the first disor-
der), symptom lists, empty frameworks, and questionnaires. 
The order of disorders was counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. We asked them to keep the indicated order. Par-
ticipants could send an email in case they had questions.
Participants added very few new symptoms. Only two 
symptoms were mentioned more than once. These were 
“ambivalent relations” and “distrust,” mentioned by four par-
ticipants for RAD. We included these two in our analyses.
Interventions rating task. After participants returned 
their drawings, questionnaires inquiring about interven-
tions’ effectiveness and effects were sent 2 weeks later by 
email. In between individualized materials for each par-
ticipant were prepared. The first part of the questionnaire 
was identical for all participants. For all four disorders the 
same 10 interventions were listed in a table: (a) medica-
tion, (b) neuro-feedback, (c) psychoeducation, (d) parent 
support, (e) family therapy, (f) teacher support, (g) CBT, 
(h) aggression regulation therapy, (i) social skills training, 
and (j) creative therapy. These interventions were selected 
because they are recommended in the Dutch national 
guidelines for effective interventions (NJi, 2013; cf. Carr, 
2009) and frequently used for at least one of the four 
disorders. Participants were asked to indicate the effec-
tiveness of interventions for each disorder, with 1 indicat-
ing that the intervention would be the most effective, 2 
that it would be the second most effective, and 3 that it 
would be the third most effective intervention. Also, they 
could indicate 0 for the intervention they believed to be 
least effective. It was explained that they should judge 
the effectiveness of each intervention as if it were the 
only intervention and that they should not consider 
other aspects like time or money. We decided to ask for 
the most and least effective interventions to get a broader 
range of rankings that could be compared to predictions 
derived from participants’ personal theories.
The next part of the questionnaire was individualized 
for each participant. For each disorder the participant 
received a separate table with column headings present-
ing the 10 interventions, and rows presenting the factors 
and symptoms included in the participant’s personal the-
ory of the disorder. The participant received no informa-
tion about the causal relations she or he had included in 
the models. The participant was asked to indicate which 
factors or symptoms were directly affected by each inter-
vention (if any), by placing an X in the respective cells. 
We explained that interventions’ effects were indirect if 
these were achieved via other factors or symptoms. 
Questionnaires were returned by email.
Assignment of factors to categories. Participants 
devised a large number of causal factors affecting the 
symptoms. We assigned these factors to categories. Cat-
egories were based on Carr’s (2006) summary of different 
theories for ADHD, behavior disorders, and autism. A 
total of 24 different categories resulted. Two coders inde-
pendently assigned all factors from participants’ models 
to categories. They agreed in 93.8% of their assignments 
(ranging from 89.5% to 97.8% for the four disorders). Dis-
agreements were resolved by discussion. Participants 
sometimes placed the same variable (symptom or factor) 
on more than one level within the same model. Partici-
pants disagreed most often about the assignment of 
attachment, conflicts with family or authorities, and prob-
lems in social interactions. Some participants assigned 
these variables to the environmental level, others to the 
behavioral level, and some to both levels. Therefore we 
decided to add the interpersonal level, which has been 
proposed by Carr (2006), and to assign these three vari-
ables to this new level. A second major point of disagree-
ment was the assignment of impulsivity, inattention and 
hyperactivity in ADHD. Some therapists assigned these 
variables to the cognitive, others to the behavioral, and 
some to both levels. It is interesting that Carr (2006) 
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distinguishes for all three between a behavioral and a 
cognitive feature. As participants seem to endorse this 
distinction, we decided to recode these three variables 
into cognitive or behavioral impulsivity, inattention, or 
hyperactivity. Table 1 shows the resulting list of variables 
on which all further analyses were based.
Results
Personal theories
First, we assessed the symptoms, factors, and causal rela-
tions in participants’ personal theories. Participants’ mod-
els contained on average 12.7 variables and 25.2 causal 
relations (11.3 to 15.9 variables and 18.7 to 34.8 causal 
relations, for the different disorders). They judged their 
models to be reasonably adequate representations of 
their personal theories (M = 4.4, SD = 0.7 on a scale of 1 
[not at all representative] to 7 [perfect]). Table 1 shows the 
proportion of participants who had included each vari-
able in their model (with symptoms provided on the 
symptom list in italics).
As Table 1 and the average causal maps presented in 
Figure 2 indicate, participants created disorder-specific 
models. We calculated agreement among participants 
with respect to the variables included in their theories 
using Fleiss’s (1971) kappa, a generalization of Cohen’s 
kappa. It quantifies the agreement of the judgments of 
more than two people on a scale from −1 to 1, with 0 
indicating no agreement. The resulting values were κ = 
.29 for ADHD, κ = .40 for autism, κ = .43 for CD, and κ = 
.33 for RAD. These kappa values indicate fair agreement 
for ADHD and RAD, and moderate agreement for autism 
and CD (cf. Landis & Koch, 1977).
We also calculated clinicians’ agreement about causal 
relations. A causal relation between two variables could 
be included only if both variables were present. To cap-
ture agreements that were representative for at least a 
considerable subgroup of participants, we included only 
pairs of variables into the analysis that were present in 
the models of at least 25% of participants (n = 5). Other-
wise agreements would reflect only the fact that partici-
pants did not include the variables. For ADHD 148 pairs 
of variables fulfilled the criterion, 158 for autism, 346 for 
CD, and 199 for RAD. If participants agreed about causal 
relations, they were to either include or exclude causal 
relations for these pairs of variables. We again calculated 
agreements using kappa. The results showed only fair 
agreement among participants: κ = .29 for ADHD, κ = .26 
for autism, and κ = .23 for RAD. Almost no agreement 
was found for CD, κ = .13. Taken together, these results 
show that participants’ theories of the disorders did not 
agree with each other very much.
The rather low agreement is also apparent in the 
causal models presented in Figure 2. For each disorder 
there were only a few variables that were included by a 
majority of participants and even fewer causal relations 
endorsed by at least 50% of participating clinicians.
Judgments of interventions
Table 2 shows how often each type of intervention was 
chosen as one of the three most effective. It also shows 
the mean rank assigned to each intervention with lower 
numbers indicating higher effectiveness. The most effec-
tive intervention received rank 1, the second most effec-
tive rank 2, the third most effective rank 3, and the least 
effective intervention rank 10. Whenever participants 
assigned the same number to several interventions, ranks 
were reassigned so that the rank sum remained constant 
across participants (a rank sum of 55, which equals the 
sum of ranks 1–10). This procedure was necessary for 
subsequent statistical analyses.
As Table 2 shows, participants considered different 
interventions as most effective for each disorder. We cal-
culated participants’ agreement about the effectiveness of 
interventions for each disorder. First, we calculated kappa 
for whether an intervention was chosen as one of the 
three most effective. The resulting values were κ = .32 for 
ADHD, κ = .38 for autism, κ = .36 for CD, and finally κ = 
.43 for RAD. These kappa values indicate fair (ADHD, 
autism, CD) and moderate agreement (RAD; cf. Landis & 
Koch, 1977). Second, we calculated multiple rank order 
correlations among participants for each disorder using 
Cohen’s w. The resulting values were w = .44 for ADHD, 
w = .39 for autism, w = .42 for CD, and w = .53 for RAD, 
which again indicate moderate agreements.
Prediction of judgments of 
interventions from personal theories
To predict the effectiveness of the different interventions, 
we included the interventions as additional factors in par-
ticipants’ theoretical models. We calculated the causal cen-
trality of the interventions as a measure of their causal 
influence on all other variables within the model. Highly 
central interventions directly or indirectly affect all or most 
other variables, whereas peripheral interventions target 
only variables not affecting other variables. Calculations 
were based on the computational model devised by Slo-
man, Love, and Ahn (1998; see the appendix for details). 
Centralities of all 10 interventions were calculated and 
turned into a rank order with the most causally influential 
intervention receiving rank 1. This was done for every par-
ticipant and every disorder. Next, these rankings were cor-
related with the actual ranking of the interventions made 
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by each participant. Table S3 in the Supplemental Material 
available online shows the resulting correlations for each 
participant and each disorder. The analysis showed that 
individual causal maps corresponded to participants’ esti-
mates of efficacy often quite well, 34 out of 80 correlations 
were ρ ≥ .50, indicating an at least moderate correlation 
(cf. Cohen, 1988; Ferguson, 2009). For more than half of 
the clinicians, at least two of the four correlations were ρ 
≥ .50. Effectiveness judgments of two participants corre-
sponded almost perfectly with the predictions derived 
from their models for all four disorders. There were three 
participants, though, whose maps did not correlate with 
their estimates for neither disorder.
To analyze correlations statistically, we averaged them 
across participants for each disorder using a Fisher’s z 
transformation. Mean correlations were ρ = .55 for ADHD, 
ρ = .47 for autism, ρ = .56 for CD, and ρ = .55 for RAD. 
All four correlations were significantly larger than zero 
with p < .05. To use a more robust test of significance, we 
also did a bootstrap analysis. It turned out that all four 
mean correlations were significant with p < .01.
Discussion
We investigated clinicians’ personal theories for ADHD, 
autism, CD, and RAD to see (a) whether clinicians had simi-
lar theories for these disorders, (b) whether clinicians had 
similar expectations for the effectiveness of common inter-
ventions for each disorder, and crucially (c) whether clini-
cians’ judgments of interventions could be predicted from 
their personal theories of how biological, cognitive, environ-
mental, and behavioral factors interact to cause the symp-
toms of a disorder. Participating clinicians worked in similar 
intramural institutions, and had ample experience with chil-
dren with the four disorders. Still, clinicians’ personal theo-
ries varied considerably, resulting in no more than moderate 
agreements. Also, we found only fair to moderate agree-
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Fig. 2. Average causal models generated by clinicians. Shown variables were included by at least 50% of 
participants, variables with a thick border by 80%. Solid arrows indicate causal links included by at least 50% 
of participants, dashed arrows links that were included by at least 50% of participants who included the two 
connected variables in their model. Variables not connected by causal links in the graphs were generally con-
nected in the causal map generated by the individual clinician.
effectiveness of 10 common and recommended interven-
tions for the disorders. Despite the low level of agreement 
we could predict participants’ judgments of the effective-
ness of interventions from their personal theories. More pre-
cisely, clinicians’ causal models predicted judgments of 
efficacy on the group level, and they often predicted the 
judgments of individual clinicians for specific disorders. 
Thus, our findings indicate that clinicians’ personal theories 
about disorders are likely to be important for clinicians’ rea-
soning about interventions. They at least sometimes seem to 
use their personal theories to assess effectiveness.
These results are in line with theories assuming that deci-
sion makers use causal models to infer the effects of avail-
able interventions (Hagmayer & Witteman, in press; Sloman 
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& Hagmayer, 2006). They also extend previous research on 
clinical judgments. Specifically, they add to the findings of 
Ahn et al. (2009), who showed that clinicians hold beliefs 
about the biological, psychological, and social nature of 
DSM–IV–TR disorders and that these beliefs are related to 
preferences for medication or psychotherapy. Going beyond 
this study, we analyzed clinicians’ theories about the causal 
relations among biological, environmental, cognitive, and 
behavioral variables, and showed that these assumptions 
are related to the judgments of specific types of interven-
tions that are recommended in the literature for these disor-
ders. Finally, it was found earlier that clinicians construct 
different causal models to explain the problems of the same 
client, and that from these individual models intervention 
judgments could be predicted (De Kwaadsteniet et  al., 
2010). The present results indicate that differences in client 
models and intervention judgments could at least partly be 
due to different personal theories of disorders.
Strategies to assess effectiveness
Personal theories explained participants’ judgments of 
effectiveness quite well in many, but not all cases, and 
almost perfectly for only two participants. They failed to 
make any accurate prediction for three participants. 
These findings indicate that participants probably used a 
variety of different strategies to rate the effectiveness of 
interventions.
Inferences about effectiveness can be drawn from 
causal models in several ways. One strategy would be to 
activate the causal model and run a mental simulation to 
predict the consequences of each intervention (Pliske & 
Klein, 2003; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006). A simpler causal 
heuristic would be to activate a causal model and rate 
interventions that target root or causally central causes as 
more effective than interventions targeting mere symp-
toms (cf. Ahn et al., 2009). Both strategies may underlie 
the significant correlations we found.
Another judgment strategy that some participants may 
have used would be to rely on the results of effectiveness 
studies or on recommendations from evidence-based 
guidelines. The Dutch guideline for children and adoles-
cents with ADHD advises medication, psychoeducation, 
and parent support (NJi, 2013; Trimbos-instituut, 2007, 
2011). Participants’ ratings (as shown in Table 2) tended 
to be in line with these recommendations. For CD behav-
ioral training for parents is advised for children younger 
than 12 years old, CBT and family therapy for children 12 
and older (NJi, 2013; cf. Carr, 2009; Dretzke et al., 2005; 
Ollendick & King, 2000). Participants who worked mostly 
with teenagers showed a strong preference for behav-
ioral interventions, but fewer than half ranked family 
therapy as one of the three most effective interventions. 
For the treatment of autism and RAD, good evidence is 
scarce (cf. Carr, 2009; Ollendick & King, 2000). NJi (2013) 
advises the use of psychoeducation and parent or family 
support for autism first. Our participants seem to follow 
this advice. For RAD, parent support and family therapy 
is recommended (NJi, 2013). Participating clinicians only 
partially followed this advice. CBT was chosen more 
often as most effective.
Some clinicians may have relied on their clinical expe-
rience. If they have often experienced success with one 
type of intervention they might generally expect this 
intervention to be effective for a particular disorder. This 
strategy may explain judgments that were unrelated to 
clinicians’ personal theories. Clinical experience, how-
ever, may also support personal theories and therefore 
strengthen the belief in them.
To find out which strategy or combination of strategies 
individual clinicians use, carefully controlled experimen-
tal studies involving many cases would be needed (for 
potential methodologies, see Glöckner & Witteman, 2010; 
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, & Raynard, 2011).
Table 2. Judgments of Interventions for Effectiveness: 
Percentage of Participants Who Considered Each Type of 
Intervention as One of the Three Most Effective, and Mean 
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Personal theories versus  
scientific theories
We used Morton’s (2004) causal modeling framework to 
analyze clinicians’ personal theories of four common 
developmental disorders. The same framework has been 
used before to analyze scientific theories of three of these 
disorders. Krol et al. (2004) analyzed scientific theories 
for CD, and Morton (2004) summarizes scientific theories 
of autism and ADHD. Although we did not intend to 
compare participants’ theories with scientific theories, we 
noticed a few interesting points. First, it seems that par-
ticipants’ personal theories tended to include less specific 
factors than scientific theories. Although some partici-
pants did use specific factors (e.g., “abnormality in gray 
mass”), such specific factors were rare. In addition, sev-
eral participants had used the same variable on different 
levels in one model. For example, “intelligence” was 
placed at both the cognitive and biological levels, and 
“communication problems” was placed at the biological, 
cognitive, environmental, and behavioral levels. Ahn and 
colleagues (2009) reported a similar observation. They 
found that clinicians sometimes rated a specific causal 
factor to be biological, psychological, and environmental 
at the same time.
Second, participants presented quite elaborate per-
sonal theories with respect to the causal relations among 
the various cognitive and behavioral factors and symp-
toms. Feedback loops occurred frequently in participants’ 
drawings. Scientific theories tend to be simpler at this 
point, focusing on major causal mechanisms. They are 
also less complex on the behavioral level, often just men-
tioning a few disorder-defining symptoms. This finding 
may be due to the fact that our participants started the 
task with the identification of typical symptoms from a 
list. This procedure might have cued participants to focus 
on the behavioral and cognitive level. In addition, 
dynamic networks of symptoms may be important in cli-
nicians’ personal theories, either from recent growing sci-
entific interest in the analysis of disorders as dynamic 
networks (e.g., Borsboom & Cramer, 2013), or from clini-
cal experience. According to dynamic network approaches, 
disorders are constituted by an interaction of symptoms 
(emotions, cognitions, behaviors), and negative vicious 
circles, rather than by symptoms, which are effects of 
underlying root causes.
Finally, participants seemed to have integrated ele-
ments of different scientific theories in their personal 
theories. It is interesting that one of the conclusions that 
Krol et al. (2004) arrived at was that different scientific 
theories for CD complement each other. Thus, not only 
would it have made sense for participants to combine 
different theories in their personal theories, this would 
also be in line with EBP. However, only a few clinicians 
mentioned specific scientific theories when queried 
about them in the questionnaires. For autism, the theory 
of mind was mentioned five times. With RAD, attachment 
theory was mentioned three times, twice with the speci-
fication that it was Bowlby’s. Apparently, participants 
were often not aware of the origin of the scientific theo-
ries they may have used.
Limitations
Our study focused on four developmental disorders and 
10 respective interventions and involved 20 experienced 
child psychotherapists. We cannot be sure how results 
generalize to other disorders, interventions, and profes-
sionals providing mental health care. However, the level 
of disagreement that we found was striking, given that 
our participants worked with similar clients in three simi-
lar institutions and had plenty of experience with the 
four disorders. Hence we would expect even less agree-
ment across clinicians having a different therapeutic or 
occupational background and working with other groups 
of clients. We would still expect to find coherence 
between personal theories and effectiveness ratings 
because a high sensitivity to causal beliefs has been 
found for a broad variety of disorders, across different 
disciplines, and different levels of expertise (Ahn et al., 
2009; De Kwaadsteniet, Kim, & Yopchick, 2011; Kim & 
Ahn, 2002; Proctor & Ahn, 2007).
Another limitation is that participants were asked to 
rate only effectiveness. They did not have to make 
actual choices for individual clients. Intervention choices 
in practice also depend on other factors like budget, 
time, personal characteristics of clients (e.g., motiva-
tion) and clinicians (e.g., experience), and institutions 
(e.g., protocols; cf. Clarkin & Levy, 2004; Nelson & 
Steele, 2008).
Implications
Our results indicate that many clinicians rely on their 
personal causal theories, which differ to a rather large 
extend across clinicians, when judging the effectiveness 
of interventions. This finding raises several important 
implications for research in clinical decision making, pro-
fessional training, and evidence-based clinical practice. 
We will discuss these in turn.
One implication is that we need to know more about 
how clinicians acquire their personal theories, which 
later guide their decisions. At present we know rather 
little about how clinicians integrate their knowledge 
about scientific theories with knowledge derived from 
clinical practice. Bayesian theories of learning (e.g., 
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011) provide 
a conceptual and formal framework that would allow us 
to describe and explain how experience and knowledge 
interact in learning. Respective studies will help us to 
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understand why personal theories of clinicians diverge to 
so such a large degree. A second important empirical 
question is when clinicians use personal causal theories to 
judge treatment options and to make decisions on care. 
Theoretical analyses indicate that it may not always be 
wise to rely on personal theories (Hagmayer & Witteman, 
in press). For straightforward diagnoses of disorders for 
which the most effective treatments are known, rule-based 
or script-based reasoning might be appropriate. By con-
trast, if a client presents with multiple disorders, or an ear-
lier treatment was ineffective, causal reasoning may help 
the clinician to identify the most effective intervention. 
Whether clinicians use their personal theories in a way 
that improves their treatment choices is not known yet.
Our findings also entail that current professional train-
ing—at least in the Netherlands—seems insufficient for 
clinicians to acquire highly valid and reliable theories of 
developmental disorders. Therefore, an important ques-
tion is how training programs should be redesigned for 
clinicians (practicing and in training) to learn about 
empirically well-validated scientific theories and integrate 
these theories into their personal theories, such that per-
sonal theories become more similar and evidence-based. 
The same question arises for knowledge about effective 
interventions, and their mechanisms of change. If clini-
cians are supported in acquiring evidence-based theories 
of disorders that include evidence-based treatments, they 
may become more likely to apply scientific evidence in 
their practice. Clinicians may also need training and sup-
port in the explicit formulation and testing of causal 
hypotheses for specific clients (cf. De Kwaadsteniet et al., 
2010; Ghaderi, 2007).
Finally, there are important implications of our find-
ings for EBP. The first is that clinicians need evidence that 
would allow them to form valid, evidence-based personal 
theories. Unfortunately, for many interventions and disor-
ders there is still an incomplete evidence base (cf. Carr, 
2009; Ollendick & King, 2000). In particular, mecha-
nisms that lead to and maintain disorders and mecha-
nisms by which interventions cause change are still 
largely unknown (Bieling & Kuyken, 2003; Borsboom & 
Cramer, 2013; De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2006; Kazdin, 
2008). As much is still unknown, clinicians’ personal the-
ories may vary considerably and therefore afford differ-
ent judgments and decisions. This explains why clinicians’ 
personal theories at present can be a source of bias 
(Garb, 2005) rather than a pillar of EBP. Therefore, 
clinicians should be aware that their causal beliefs may 
only partially conform to existing evidence, but may nev-
ertheless shape their judgments and decisions. That is 
why they should be advised to consider other sources of 
evidence whenever possible.
The finding that clinicians consider causal mechanisms 
when judging the effectiveness of treatment options also 
has implications for the communication of scientific evi-
dence about the efficacy of interventions. To inform and 
change clinical practice toward EBP, it may be important 
to communicate information about the mechanisms by 
which interventions cause their effects. This information 
would enable clinicians to incorporate scientific informa-
tion about the effectiveness of interventions into their 
personal theories more easily. In consequence, they may 
sooner apply new insights. Once we have and communi-
cate a more complete understanding of the mechanisms 
causing and maintaining disorders and of the mecha-
nisms making interventions effective, clinicians may have 
more valid personal theories, and make more reliable 
and evidence-based decisions (cf. Grove, 2005; Shrout, 
2011).
Appendix
Causal centralities, that is, the degree to which variables within 
a causal model depend on each other, can be computed using 
a simple iterative model (see Kim & Ahn, 2002; Sloman et al., 
1998). The starting point is a matrix D representing the causal 
relations (dij) among cause variables I and effects J. The degree 
to which an effect j depends on a cause i is captured by the 
cell entries dij. We set dij to .8, when two variables were caus-
ally related in a participant’s model, and to 0, when they were 
not. Causal centralities ci were computed using the following 
iterative model:
ci,t+1 = ∑jdijcj,t
ci,t is the centrality of variable i at time t, cj is the centrality of 
the of an effect j of i and, dij are their causal dependence. Cen-
tralities were set to a random value at the beginning, but con-
verged rapidly to their final values. This computational model 
makes intuitive sense: The centrality of a variable depends on 
the number and strength of its causal relations to other vari-
ables, and the centrality of these other variables. If a variable 
has not effects, that is, has no variables that are dependent on 
it, ci drops to zero.
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